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Abstract
The paper examines decentralized cryptocurrency protocols that are based on the use of internal tokens as identity
tools. An analysis of security problems with popular Proof-of-stake consensus protocols is provided. A new protocol,
Interactive Proof-of-stake, is proposed. The main ideas of the protocol are to reduce a number of variables a miner can
iterate over to a minimum and also to bring a communication into block generation. The protocol is checked against
known attacks. It is shown that Interactive Proof-of-stake is more secure than current pure Proof-of-stake protocols.
Keywords: Cryptocurrency, Blockchain consensus protocols, Proof-of-stake, Peer-to-peer networks
1. Introduction
The core feature of Bitcoin is is the ability of
every network participant who contributes computa-
tional resources to participate in a shared ledger cre-
ation process. A few years after the Nakamoto’s
paper[1] described Proof-of-work and private fork at-
tack, some formal models with comprehensive analysis
were published[2, 3].
In a Proof-of-work system participants solve moder-
ately hard computational puzzles[3] to generate valid
blocks. The probability of generation is proportional to
their computational power (with some exceptions[4, 2]).
The puzzles could be viewed as identity tools that pre-
vent Sybil attacks in an anonymous environment. An
alternative idea behind Proof-of-stake protocols uses
internal tokens of a cryptocurrency as identity tools.
Proof-of-stake was first implemented in PeerCoin[5].
Email address: kushti@protonmail.ch (Alexander
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Then the concept was developed into several variations
having similar problems with their security models.
NeuCoin[6] and Nxt are the Proof-of-stake protocol
examples considered below.
1.1. NeuCoin
Neucoin uses the same transactional model as Bit-
coin, with a transaction having multiple inputs and out-
puts. An unspent output holder has a right to generate a
block if hash(k) 6 g ∗ vo ∗ δ where g is the target value
readjusted on each block and stored in a block header,
vo is the unspent output value, and δ is the amount of
time since the coins were touched. The kernel k is:
k = t ∪ tutxo ∪ nutxo ∪ io ∪ tblock ∪ s (1)
In the formula for k, t is the current timestamp, tutxo is
a timestamp of the output, nutxo is an index of the output
in its transaction, io is an index of the output in its block,
tblock is a timestamp of a block containing an output, and
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s is the stake modifier, a 64-bit string seeded from the
blockchain.
1.2. Nxt
Nxt has a different transactional model than Bitcoin,
with dedicated accounts holding balances. Accounts
are allowed to generate a block if the hit, an unsigned
number constructed from 256-bit generation signature,
is less than the target:
f8bu(g) < t ∗ b ∗ δ (2)
where f8bu return the first 8 bytes of a byte array as
an unsigned number, t is the base target of a previous
block, b is the account balance N blocks ago, and δ is
the delay in since the last block.
The generation signature in the formula above is a
deterministic value that depends on the value used to
generate the previous block gprev and the account’s pub-
lic key kpub:
g = hash(gprev ∪ kpub)
The base target also changes between blocks. As the
desirable delay between blocks is T seconds, the new
base target can be calculated from the base target of a
previous block tprev:
t = max(min( tprev∗δT , tprev ∗ 2), tprev2 )
Every block header contains a generation signature g
and a base target t. Cumulative difficulty dc is used to
determine the best blockchain, with larger values corre-
sponding to better chains:
dc =
∑ 1
t
(3)
If every block in a chain is generated within ( T2 , 2∗T )
seconds of the previous block, dc is proportional to the
time elapsed since the genesis block timestamp.
1.3. Why Proof-of-stake Matters
There are several reasons to search for protocols be-
yond the well-known Bitcoin consensus protocols. First
of all, Proof-of-stake provides an incentive to run a
full-node[7]. Second, a new cryptocurrency using a
Proof-of-work consensus protocol could be destroyed
by Goldfinger attack[8]. Proof-of-work could also be
infeasible for private blockchains. While traditional
Byzantine Agreements[9] could work well for a net-
works consisting of a few banks, Proof-of-stake seems
to be more suitable for large private blockchains with
unequal generation rights.
1.4. Structure of the Paper
Section 2 describes some problems with existing
Proof-of-stake consensus protocols. An alternative
stake-based protocol, the Interactive Proof-of-stake, is
proposed in Section 3. The novel approach is discussed
in Section 4.
2. Open Problems With Existing Proof-of-stake Im-
plementations
Many attacks against Proof-of-stake consensus proto-
cols have been proposed. Following list has been com-
piled based on papers[10, 7], internet resources[11, 12,
13] and private conversations.
1. Grinding Attacks
Iterations over some of the parameters in the formu-
las given in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 create the possibil-
ity for several attacks. In particular, as there are no
precise global clocks in a distributed network an at-
tacker can iterate over current time values to find a
better option than a real timestamp of the local sys-
tem. In addition, attackers can iterate over the public
2
keys (for Nxt) or unspent output parameters (Neu-
coin).
For example, with Neucoin’s dynamic kernels it is
possible to find a better kernel value by iterating
over the allowed range of current timestamps. As
NeuCoin allows block time to be set up to 2 hours
later than a previous time, a selfish miner could cal-
culate 7200 kernel values and immediately publish
block with a timestamp from the future. Assum-
ing that each network participant is selfish, the net-
work could publish all of the blocks extending cur-
rent blockchain within the next 2 hours, causing triv-
ial system instability.
Nxt is free from time drifting as hit value is static.
However, it is possible to iterate over δ. To prevent
this, Nxt has a 15 second propagation rule: incoming
blocks are propagated only if their timestamps are
within 15 seconds of that of a last local block. This
limits the iteration range to at most 15 values.
2. Private-fork and Nothing-at-Stake attacks
Compared to Proof-of-work protocols, it is ex-
tremely cheap to start a fork with Proof-of-stake.
Simulations show that short private forks are prof-
itable for big stakeholders of Nxt[14]. Therefore,
selfish miners have an incentive to build on top of
every fork they encounter. However, as the number
of forks increases exponentially with time, it is not
viable to contribute to all of them, so a node retains
best forks.
With the network contributing to a tree that con-
tains F widely recognized forks Nothing-at-Stake at-
tacks are emerging. This new kind of attack is made
by a peer who is willing to double-spend by vot-
ing for an only chain containing a spending transac-
tion (whereas the rest of the network works on all F
forks). After some number of confirmations, a trans-
action recipient performs corresponding actions(for
example, sending out goods). The attacker therefore
contributes to F − 1 forks that do not contain a trans-
action. Simulations of Nxt-like consensus protocols
with explicit tree support show the attack could be
eliminated by an increase in the number of confir-
mations required before a transaction is considered
as non-reversible[15].
3. History Attacks
Attackers can buy unused private keys held a ma-
jority of stake being online in the past, then a bet-
ter chain could be generated [12]. A checkpointing
mechanism is needed to prevent this kind of attack.
4. Bribe Attacks
After an attacker sends a transaction to the net-
work, and some number k of confirmations a trans-
action recipient performs a corresponding action,
such as sending goods out. Then a sender can pub-
licly announce a reward for a better fork, revers-
ing the last k + 1 blocks to remove the transaction
from the blockchain. Such an attack is also possible
with Proof-of-work protocol, but unsuccessful attack
miners would lost a lot of resources in the attack. In
contrast, bribed miners in a Proof-of-stake protocol
will never lose anything because they can contribute
to both forks for very little[10].
2.1. Why Proof-of-stake Cryptocurrencies Work
No practical implementations of the aforementioned
attacks are currently known. There are two reasons for
this:
1. Security Through Default Implementation
Nxt and private forks are discussed here. The
single existing Nxt protocol implementation, Nxt
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Reference Software(NRS), stores only a single
blockchain. A big stakeholder can earn more[14]
by adding an explicit local blocktree storage to
the software. Then she can distribute the modi-
fied software. Nothing-at-Stake attacks are only a
threat when a majority of online are using the mod-
ified software. There is a little incentive to modify
a single copy even because current mining rewards
are small.
2. Security Through Checkpoints
With NRS, Nxt has a few hard-coded checkpoints
and a 720-block reversal limit so only new nodes
that are downloading the best chain from the gene-
sis block could suffer a successful History attack
resulting in a fork not deeper than a hardcoded
checkpoint.
Both practical security measures are inappropriate for
long-term use with decentralized cryptocurrency that
is intended for global adoption. In contrast, private
blockchains can be assumed to be a running specific
protocol implementation on most of their nodes.
3. Interactive Proof-of-stake
There are two main idea behind this new protocol.
First of all, a number of variables a miner can iterate
over is needed to be reduced to a minimum to increase
resistance to grinding attacks. Second, we would like
to bring the communication process into block gener-
ation. It requires multiple parties for block creation
without broadcasting undersigned blocks within the net-
work. The proposal for this protocol is as follows:
1. The presence of accounts with non-zero is as-
sumed. Accounts can be viewed as (public key,
balance) pair. For monetary blockchains we can
consider monetary tokens to be balance units. For
private non-monetary blockchains we can set cor-
respondences in a genesis block so that network
participants have transferable or non-transferable
generation rights.
2. Block headers contain some unique seed value
known to all participants to determine the gener-
ators of the next blocks.
3. T accounts are needed to generate a single block.
We consider T = 3. To avoid network propagation
of block candidates do not have enough signatures,
only one account is allowed to sign and broadcast
a block, but each block must contain T tickets. For
T = 3 we denote ticket types as Ticket1, Ticket2,
Ticket3. To generate a block one instance of each
type is necessary.
4. Each ticket is made of a corresponding block seed,
a public key pk and the balance b of an account.
Using this data we can calculate a score st of a
ticket. First, we calculate hash(seed ∪ pk). Then
the first byte of the digest is used to generate
Ticket1, the second, to generate Ticket2, and the
third to generate Ticket3. The byte value is an un-
signed number m. If 0 < m 6 R, where R is some
constant, then st = m ∗ log2 b; otherwise st = 0.
5. For a block of height h an account can generate up
to three tickets with positive score: an instance of
Ticket1 by using the seed of a block at height h−2,
an instance of Ticket2, using the seed of a block at
height h − 1, and an instance of Ticket3, using the
seed of a block at height h. If a ticket’s score is
positive, then the account signs it and broadcasts
to the network. Ticket size (including a signature)
is about 100 bytes, so tickets can be propagated
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around the network quickly and effectively.
6. Only one ticket per account per last l blocks is al-
lowed.
7. Only the Ticket1 instance generator forms a block
containing transactions and the three tickets.
8. A blockchain begins with three genesis blocks in-
stead of one to avoid breaking ticket generation
rules for the first block after genesis.
9. If the three tickets of a block are generated by ac-
counts with public keys pk1, pk2, and pk3 then
the seed of that block is calculated as seed =
hash(seedprev ∪ pk1 ∪ pk2 ∪ pk3), where seedprev is
the seed of a previous block.
10. A block’s score sb is the sum of its ticket scores:
sb = st1 + st2 + st3 . A blockchain’s score is the sum
of its block scores: sbc =
∑
sb. The chain with
the greatest score wins. Block generators there-
fore have an incentive to build blocks using the best
tickets available.
11. If R < 255, then it is possible for all miners to gen-
erate m values outside the range, meaning no tick-
ets will be generated. Some protection against that
is required for pure Proof-of-stake systems, for ex-
ample, if the delay since the last block is more than
D seconds then for a new block R = 255, sti = m. If
D is large, a chain without hanging problems will
get a block with a better sti values, and additional
blocks will be generated during the delay.
12. Block reward is to be split equally amongst ticket
generators.
13. It is necessary to limit block generation frequency.
For example, a minimum delay after the last block
and a propagation rule like the one used for Nxt
could be specified.
Consider a scenario in which NA accounts are on-
line. The ticket generation could be seen as a two-step
weighted lottery. First, a random subset of average size
(R−1)∗NA
256 will be chosen regardless on the account stake.
Then each account in the set will obtain some random
number m (0 < m 6 R) to generate a ticket with a score
m ∗ log2 b.
Considering the moment at which block bh (of height
h) arrives at a node that has an account A onboard. A can
generate up to three tickets with positive scores: an in-
stance of Ticket3 for a block of height h+1, an instance
of Ticket2 for a block of height h+2, and an instance of
Ticket1 for a block of height h+3. Tickets with positive
scores will be broadcasted immediately. At the moment
of arrival, A supposedly also has tickets based on blocks
bh−3, bh−2, and bh−1. In particular, A could have a better
ticket than any of bh’s. In that case it is reasonable to
postpone bh processing and wait for a better block for
some time. If A can generate a better block than bh, A
will do so and broadcast that block instead of bh pro-
cessing.
4. Discussion of the Protocol
4.1. Time and Balance
The protocol does not include timestamps or time de-
lays and is therefore immune to time drifting attacks.
The protocol’s balance is static. To implement the pro-
tocol, we could use an account balance from N blocks
ago, as Nxt does.
4.2. The Protocol Simulation
An executable simulation of the protocol has been
published online under a public domain license [16].
Wealth distribution in Bitcoin is described by a
stretched exponential function[17]. For simplicity, a
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negative exponential distribution with λ = 50 was used
to simulate block generation. The simulation consisted
of 800 accounts sharing approximately 1.6 billion coins
and generating 30,000 empty blocks (R = 16, l = 10).
The results were as follows:
1. ≈ 89% of accounts generated at least one ticket
2. Poor(< 0.1% of stake) and rich(> 0.7%) accounts
held disproportionally low shares of tickets
4.3. Resistance to Attacks
1. Private forks and History attacks
Even very rich single account can generate no
more than one ticket per l blocks. To maximize
her chance of lottery participation, a large stake-
holder needs to split her funds into  256R+1 ac-
counts. An attacker’s accounts have a better chance
to generate a better fork if for a majority of pos-
sible clusters of size R256+1 an account controlled
by her has a greater balance than others. There-
fore, to maximize a chance of an attack success
on a cryptocurrency with exponential distribution
of wealth the best strategy is to split stake equally
into as small as possible number of parts while
enough to generate all the tickets with no hang-
ing. The tool for simulating this kind of attack
is published online[16]. We simulated a compe-
tition between a network of 800 accounts and an
attacker. The network had an exponential wealth
distribution (λ = 50) and approximately 1.6 bil-
lion coins. The attacker had x percent of a network
stake, equally divided into P parts. For R = 16, l =
10, P ≈ 180 is the best choice; an attacker with
x = 50 has ≈ 8.3% chance of generating a better
chain of length 10 and no chance of generating a
better chain of length 50. This means that a net-
work with the given parameters is secure against
private fork attack by richest holders of 13 of online
stake, for 50 confirmations. The same adversarial
power against Nxt consensus protocol has ≈ 14%
chance of generating a better chain of length 10
and ≈ 1.7% chance of generating a better chain of
length 50.
Under conditions of optimal stake distribution,
History attacks have the same chances of success
as the aforementioned private fork attacks if none
of the purchased accounts participate in block gen-
eration after the attack has begun. In practice, both
requirements are unlikely to be met, so the chance
of success will be lower than of a private fork at-
tack.
2. Bribe attacks
We consider a set of online accounts to be static
during a bribe attack. At the moment of bribe
proposal the best possible chain suffix of k blocks
has already been generated and therefore cannot be
substituted. An attacker can offer a bribe in ad-
vance of an attack to postpone best ticket publish-
ing, but the ticket reward will be lost if the attack
fails. Also collusion between more parties is re-
quired than in existing Proof-of-stake protocols.
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3. Grinding and Iteration attacks
Forcing block seeds to choose more attacker ac-
counts in the future is the only method of attack.
As block seeds depend on the public keys of all
three ticket generators, an attacker’s accounts need
to generate more than three best possible tickets for
a block to iterate over them. Thus grinding attacks
are harder to perform in comparison with Nxt and
Neucoin.
4.4. Block Trees
We argue there is no incentive even for a large stake-
holder to modify the node software aiming to contribute
to multiple chains. Even if she has enough stake to com-
pete with the rest of the network, she is whether working
on her own chain or network’s. However, if the major-
ity of miners are already working on multiple chains,
the best strategy for a single miner is to contribute to all
of them.
5. Related Work
The prospect of having multiple block generators was
raised in the Proof-of-activity proposal[7], which con-
sidered extending Proof-of-work via additional stake-
holder signatures. The Chains-of-activity proposal[10]
extends the Proof-of-activity lottery to a pure Proof-of-
stake protocol, in which each block provides a single
random bit and a sequence of random bits determines a
future block generator. The Tendermint whitepaper[18]
offers Byzantine Agreements to participants who have
made security deposits.
6. Further Work
6.1. Dynamic R Calculation
It can be difficult to set the best single static R value
for the entire lifespan of a blockchain system. The more
sophisticated option is to dynamically change R based
on generation process characteristics. This could make
private fork attacks harder to perform.
6.2. Proof-of-w ork Tickets
Tickets could be used in Proof-of-Work protocols
aiming to spread rewards more evenly and reduce self-
ish mining attack[4] probability.
6.3. A Hybrid Protocol
The Interactive Proof-of-stake protocol can be used in
combination with Proof-of-work. Empty Proof-of-work
blocks could act as random beacons[19] to generate the
tickets for the next S blocks. They could also act as
decentralized voting tools to enforce chain selection in
a Proof-of-stake blocktree. External random beacons
could eliminate grinding atacks. Chain selection en-
forcement for a blocktree via decentralized voting could
eliminate forks deeper than S blocks. A hybrid protocol
would remind Bitcoin-NG[20] with many stakeholders
(rather than a single miner) working on microblocks.
This way the network participants have Proof-of-work
security guarantees, fast blocks and an incentive to run
a full-node.
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed possible security problems of
current Proof-of-stake blockchain consensus protocols
compiling a comprehensive list of attacks known at the
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moment of writing the paper. A new pure Proof-of-
stake protocol with multiple block generators, Interac-
tive Proof-os-stake, is proposed. It has a minimum num-
ber of variables a miner can iterate over. It has no times-
tamps or time delays explicitly stated. Instead, the new
protocol operates as a weighted lottery where multiple
winners create a block. We have checked the protocol
against known attacks list. Results show that a global
cryptocurrency running the protocol is immune to a pri-
vate fork attack made with up to 13 of network’s on-
line stake(for 50 confirmations); a bribe attack becomes
more tricky and requires more parties to collude with
a participant losing a ticket reward in case of failed at-
tack; grinding attacks are possible over public keys only
and harder to perform than in Nxt and NeuCoin. How-
ever, we do not claim the security of our protocol is
better or the same than that of Proof-of-work protocols.
Nevertheless, the new protocol could be useful for pri-
vate blockchains and hybrid (Proof-of-work mixed with
Proof-of-stake) protocols.
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